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INTRODUCTION
Almost 5.1 million people in America, or one in forty-five
Americans, were under supervised release' at the end of 2008.2
These people are subject to a number of restrictions, including
restrictions on where they may live, where they may travel, and
what they may do with their days. They are required to check in
with their parole officers, are subject to drug testing, and live
with the constant risk that, should they fail to comply with the
t AB 2008, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2011, The University of
Chicago Law School.
I Throughout this Comment, supervised release is used to refer to both probation
and parole, unless otherwise noted, since for the purposes of this Comment they are
treated identically (except in sentencing procedure). See FRCrP 32.1 (Revoking or
Modifying Probation or Supervised Release); 18 USC § 3583; 18 USC § 3563. As defined
by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, "[pirobation is a court-ordered period of correctional
supervision in the community generally as an alternative to incarceration. In some cases
probation can be a combined sentence of incarceration followed by a period of community
supervision. Parole is a period of conditional supervised release in the community follow-
ing a prison term." Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole in the United
States, 2008 1 n 1 (DOJ 2009), online at http/bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus
08.pdf (visited Sept 14, 2010). Congress ended the practice of parole in 1984 for federal
crimes committed after November 1, 1987, replacing it with conditional release. Condi-
tional release differs from the older system of parole in that parole meant that after a
prisoner served the minimum part of his sentence, a "parole board" would determine
whether he was ready to be released. Conditional release, by contrast, means that the
prisoner serves a certain predetermined portion of his sentence before being released into
conditional release, also for a predetermined period. See notes 4-24 and accompanying
text. Every state has some system of conditional release. See generally Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Characteristics of State Parole Supervising Agencies, 2006 (DOJ 2008), online
at http/bjs.ojp.usdo.gov/content/pub/pdf/cspsa06.pdf (visited Sept 14, 2010). Today,
almost all prisoners are released on conditional release. For example, in 2008, 683,106
prisoners were released, 505,168 conditionally. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in
2008 Table 4 (DOJ Dec 2009), online at http//bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf
(visited Sept 14, 2010).
2 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2008 at 1
(cited in note 1).
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restrictions placed on them, their freedom will be revoked and
they will be returned to prison.
These people are often members of at-risk populations. As a
result, the current economic recession has hit them especially
hard, making it even more difficult for them to comply with the
conditions of their release, such as finding and maintaining
employment.
Offenders sometimes stay in prison too long as a result of
administrative mistakes or substantively or procedurally im-
proper policies made by the Bureau of Prisons. Often these
offenders' only recourse is to collaterally attack their sentences
in post-conviction proceedings under 28 USC § 2255. 3
This Comment examines what happens when a prisoner has
challenged an administrative action or mistake by the Bureau of
Prisons using post-conviction proceedings under 28 USC § 2255,
and while that action is pending, the Bureau of Prison releases
the prisoner into a term of supervised release. Should the extra
time served in prison be "credited" toward the term of supervised
release? What is the relationship between imprisonment and
supervised release? Can courts hear these claims at all, or are
they moot? How should the justiciability doctrines be understood
in this context? What result, if any, does the economic recession
have on this analysis?
In an effort to answer these questions, this Comment pro-
ceeds as follows. Part I outlines the applicable statutes and the
justiciability doctrines, with an emphasis on the mootness doc-
3 28 USC § 2255 states:
A prisoner in custody under a sentence of a court established by an Act of
Congress [a federal court] claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sen-
tence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 USC § 2255(a). This statute provides federal prisoners a means of access to
attack their convictions that is "exactly commensurate" with the writ of habeas corpus
under 28 USC § 2241 that was the means by which all prisoners attacked their sentences
in post-conviction proceedings until 28 USC § 2255 was enacted. See Larry W. Yackle,
Federal Courts-Habeas Corpus 87 (Foundation 2d ed 2010); Hill v US, 368 US 424, 427-
28 (1962) ("A review of the history of Section 2255 shows that it was passed at the in-
stance of the Judicial Conference to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in adminis-
tering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nowhere in the history of
Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack
upon their convictions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties
encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more
convenient forum.") (internal citations omitted).
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trine. Part II examines cases where a prisoner collaterally
attacks his sentence and is released while the collateral attack is
pending, looking first at relevant Supreme Court precedent and
then examining the contradictory approaches of the federal cir-
cuit courts. Part III argues that these cases should not be con-
sidered moot, and that the circuits that have taken that ap-
proach have misapplied the Supreme Court's (admittedly un-
clear) jurisprudence on the mootness doctrine. Part III also ar-
gues that the mootness doctrine as articulated by the Supreme
Court needs to be reformulated, and argues that a prudential,
rather than constitutional, approach to the mootness doctrine
better fulfills the goals of the justiciability doctrines and better
comports with the judicial role in our constitutional framework.
I. SUPERVISED RELEASE, POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS,
AND THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
This Part provides a general background to the system of
supervised release in the prison system, examines the ability of
inmates to collaterally attack their convictions in post-conviction
proceedings using 28 USC § 2255, and defines the justiciability
doctrines, with a focus on the mootness doctrine.
A. Supervised Release in the Federal Courts
18 USC § 3583 allows for an inclusion of a term of super-
vised release after imprisonment to be included in an offender's
initial sentence. This period of supervised release may be man-
dated by statute or may be included at the discretion of the sen-
tencing judge.4 Depending on the level of the offense, the maxi-
mum period of supervised release is one, three, or five years. 5 In
considering the inclusion and length of a period of supervised
release, a court is to consider the same factors used when deter-
mining the length of imprisonment, including the need for the
period to reflect the seriousness of the offense, the needs of the
public, the characteristics and history of the offender, and the
need for consistency in sentencing.6
A sentencing court has some discretion in setting out the
conditions of the offender's supervised release. Some of the condi-
tions of supervised release are mandatory, including that the
4 18 USC § 3583(a).
5 18 USC § 3583(b).
6 See 18 USC § 3583(c). The factors to be considered are listed in 18 USC § 3553.
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offender not commit another crime during his period of super-
vised release, that he not unlawfully possess a controlled sub-
stance, and that he submit to a drug test within fifteen days of
release. 7 Other conditions are left to the discretion of the sen-
tencing judge, with the limitation that they be reasonably related
to the factors used in sentencing determinations and are con-
sistent with policy statements issued by the United States
Sentencing Commission.8 Potential discretionary conditions of
supervised release are listed in the "Conditions of Probation"
statute,9 and can include requirements that the defendant work
at suitable employment or pursue education or vocational train-
ing,10 perform community service,11 report to a probation officer
as directed by the court or the probation officer,1 2 reside or re-
frain from residing in specified areas, 13 or remain within the
jurisdiction of the court unless allowed to leave by the court or
the probation officer.14 The length of time a person is under su-
pervised release and the conditions imposed may be modified at
any time by the court,15 and a court may terminate a term of
supervised release after one year,16 extend the period of super-
vised release if less than the maximum was originally imposed,
17
or revoke the period of supervised release. 18
B. Credits toward Early Release and Bureau of Prisons
Programs
There are a number of programs that enable a prisoner to
shorten his length of imprisonment. The primary program is
codified at 18 USC § 3624(b). 19 This statute allows a prisoner
who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than one year to
7 See 18 USC § 3583(d).
8 18 USC § 3583(d)(1).
9 See 18 USC § 3583(d)(3); 18 USC § 3563(b).
10 18 USC § 3563(b)(4).
11 18 USC § 3563(b)(12).
12 18 USC § 3563(b)(15).
13 18 USC § 3563(b)(13).
14 18 USC § 3563(b)(14).
15 See generally 18 USC § 3583(e).
16 18 USC § 3583(e)(1).
17 See 18 USC § 3583(e)(2).
18 See 18 USC § 3583(e)(3). There are mandatory revocation provisions as well. See,
for example, 18 USC § 3583(g).
19 18 USC § 3624(b). See also Federal Bureau of Prisons, Good Conduct Time under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Program Statement P5884.03 (DOJ 2005), online at
http/www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5884_003.pdf (visited Sept 14, 2010).
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receive credit toward his release of up to fifty-four days at the
end of each year of imprisonment, subject to determination by
the Bureau of Prisons that the prisoner has "displayed exempla-
ry compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations."20 If a
prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with institutional regu-
lations, the Bureau is able to grant credit toward the sentence as
it sees appropriate, including granting no credit. 21 When calcu-
lating credits earned, the Bureau of Prisons considers whether
the prisoner is making satisfactory progress toward earning, or
has earned, a high school equivalency diploma.22
The second primary means by which a prisoner can reduce
his term in prison is to undergo treatment for substance abuse
while in prison. 18 USC § 3621(e)(2) provides that a prisoner who
completes such a program can receive up to a one-year sentence
reduction.23 The Bureau of Prisons has limited this early release
credit to inmates convicted of certain nonviolent crimes. 24
C. Post-Conviction Proceedings
If a prisoner is not eligible to reduce his terms by statutory
means, he may still claim that he has a right to be released by
the court through post-conviction proceedings. 25 Prisoners can
use post-conviction proceedings to attack the length of a sentence
or to argue that a sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or the laws of the United States.26 They can also be
used to argue any other collateral ground that may move the
court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence, including
administrative actions by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.27
20 18 USC § 3624(b)(1).
21 18 USC § 3624(b)(2).
22 18 Usc § 3624(b)(2). The Bureau of Prisons has determined that a prisoner who
has not earned, and is not making satisfactory efforts toward earning, his high school
equivalency degree can only receive up to forty-two days of good-time credit for each year
in prison. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Good Conduct Time under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act at 2 (cited in note 19).
23 18 USC § 3621(e)(2)(B). See also Federal Bureau of Prisons, Early Release
Procedures under 18 USC § 3621(e), Program Statement P5331.02 (DOJ 2009), online at
http/www.bop.gov/policy/progstal/5331 002.pdf (visited Sept 14, 2010). The Bureau of
Prisons limits the length of the credit received based on the length of the prisoners sen-
tence. See id at 7.
24 Federal Bureau of Prisons, Early Release Procedures under 18 USC § 3621(e) at 3-
5 (cited in note 23). For example, prisoners convicted of homicide, kidnapping, or aggra-
vated assault, among other crimes, are not eligible for early release.
25 See 28 USC § 2255.
26 28 USC § 2255.
27 28 USC § 2255. See also Nancy J. King and Suzanna Sherry, Habeas Corpus and
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Under 28 USC § 2255, a motion to vacate, set aside, or cor-
rect a federal prisoner's sentence must be filed in the sentencing
court. 28 The motion requires that the petitioner be "in custody,"
29
which the Court has defined broadly and includes the petitioner's
period of supervised release. 30 Congress has imposed a number of
additional procedural requirements on post-conviction proceed-
ings, including a strict one-year statute of limitations to file the
claim 31 and a limit on the number of motions that can be filed.3 2
Additionally, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 199533 requires
that all available administrative remedies be exhausted before a
prisoner is able to bring suit.34 This Comment deals primarily
with post-conviction proceedings brought to attack administra-
tive actions by the Bureau of Prisons. Like any court proceeding,
post-conviction proceedings are subject to the justiciability
doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness, defined in more
detail below.
D. The Justiciability Doctrines
Article III, Section Two of the Constitution extends the
judicial power to all cases and controversies arising under the
Constitution or the laws of the United States. 35 For a number of
reasons, the Supreme Court has developed a set of doctrines that
limit the jurisdiction of the courts, collectively known as the
justiciability doctrines. 36 A case is justiciable if the litigants are
truly adversarial and the court is capable of providing real relief
State Sentencing Reform: A Story of Unintended Consequences, 58 Duke L J 1, 2 (2008)
(discussing the fact that most collateral attacks are not for the underlying conviction or
sentence, but rather for some administrative action taken after the sentence has been
imposed).
28 See 28 USC § 2255.
29 28 USC § 2255. See also note 4 and accompanying text.
30 See Jones v Cunningham, 371 US 236, 240-43 (1963) (finding that supervised
release imposes enough restraints on a person's liberty and mobility to grant a person
serving a term of supervised release access to motions for post-conviction relief).
31 28 USC § 2255.
32 28 USC § 2255(h). "[Slecond or successive" petitions must be certified by the ap-
propriate court of appeals and must either contain newly discovered evidence that "would
be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder
would have found the movant guilty of the offense," 28 USC § 2255(h)(1), or involve a new
rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral
review. 28 USC § 2255(h)(2).
33 Pub L No 104-134 (codified and amended in various places of the USC).
34 See 42 USC § 1997(e)(a).
35 See US Const Art III, § 2.
36 For further discussion of the justiciability doctrines, see notes 149-64 and accom-
panying text.
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while avoiding encroachment into the legislative sphere through
"policy making" or issuing merely "advisory" opinions.37 These
justiciability doctrines include standing, ripeness, and mootness,
and each acts as a "gatekeeper" to entry into federal court.38
Courts and scholars often conflate these doctrines, 39 but each
doctrine must be understood as a distinct principle with its own
test and application.
1. Standing and ripeness.
Standing is designed to ensure that the proper parties are
before the court. 40 To obtain standing, a party must show that
(1) she is suffering an injury that is (a) concrete and particular-
ized and (b) actual and imminent; (2) that the injury is traceable
to the defendant; and (3) that that injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision.41
Ripeness is designed to ensure that the party does not bring
the case too soon-that is, before it is "ripe."42 This doctrine is
designed to ensure that an actual injury has occurred, rather
than allowing cases to be brought every time a party fears an
injury.
2. Mootness.
Mootness attempts to ensure that a party does not bring
a case too late. 43 Just as ripeness attempts to ensure that an
injury has actually occurred, mootness attempts to ensure that
that injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. 44
For many years, mootness was characterized by the
Supreme Court as: "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame:
The requisite personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue
throughout its existence (mootness)."45 The Supreme Court has
37 See, for example, William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L J 221,
222 (1988). There is some question as to whether Article III mandates these doctrines,
particularly the mootness doctrine. See Part III below.
38 See, for example, Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example
of Mootness, 105 Harv L Rev 603, 606 (1992).
39 See notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
40 See Lee, 105 Harv L Rev at 606 (cited in note 38).
41 See Lujan v Federal Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-61 (1992).
42 Lee, 105 Harv L Rev at 606 (cited in note 38).
43 Id.
44 For further discussion see notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
45 United States Parole Commission v Geraghty, 445 US 388, 397 (1980).
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criticized this definition of mootness as being "not comprehen-
sive,"46 and efforts have been made by the Court to differentiate
standing and mootness.47 In its current formulation, a case is
moot when "the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the par-
ties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."48 "The un-
derlying concern is that when the challenged conduct ceases such
that 'there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be
repeated,' then it becomes impossible for the court to grant 'any
effectual relief whatever' to the prevailing party," thus rendering
the decision of the court merely advisory. 49 The mootness doc-
trine is designed to ensure that the court can actually do some-
thing, thus preserving judicial resources by only solving actual
disputes between defined parties.
There are a number of exceptions to the mootness doctrine,
the most important being the collateral consequences exception.
The collateral consequences exception holds that a case is only
moot "if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral
legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged
conviction."50 If a person is prohibited from exercising certain
rights (such as voting, working in certain industries, serving as a
juror, and so on) as a result of his criminal conviction, he suffers
from collateral consequences. 51 Disabilities or burdens imposed
on a petitioner because of his conviction ensure that he has "a
substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives
the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him."5 2 The scope of
the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine is
at the heart of the current circuit split over crediting extra
incarceration time toward a period of supervised release.
46 See Friends of the Earth, Inc v Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 US 167, 189-
90 (2000). This approach was developed by Professor Henry Monaghan. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L J 1363, 1384
(1973).
47 Laidlaw, 528 US at 189-90. For further discussion see Part IlI.B.
48 City of Erie v Pap's A.M., 528 US 277, 287 (2000).
49 Id (internal citations omitted). The "legally cognizable interest" requirement has
also been characterized as a "personal stake" in the outcome, which has been interpreted
to mean that "throughout the litigation, the plaintiff 'must have suffered, or be threat-
ened with, an actually injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision.'" Spencer v Kemna, 523 US 1, 7 (1998). This formulation of a
.personal stake in the outcome," however, is nearly indistinguishable from the test for
standing, a convolution of the justiciability doctrine that is problematic. For further criti-
cism of this confusion of standing and mootness, see Part III.B.2.
50 Sibron v New York, 392 US 40, 57 (1968).
51 See Carafas v LaVallee, 391 US 234, 237 (1968).
52 Id (internal citations omitted).
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II. THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE AND CREDITING EXTRA
INCARCERATION TOWARD SUPERVISED RELEASE
Imagine the following scenario: You have been sentenced to
a term of imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release.
Due to some administrative failure or inaction by the Bureau of
Prisons (miscalculation of good-time credits, failure to apply time
earned through completion of a substance abuse program, and so
on), you are in prison for longer than you should be. You collat-
erally attack your sentence, asking to be released from prison.
While that action is pending, the Board of Prisons releases you
into supervised release, and files a petition with the court to de-
clare the post-conviction proceedings moot. The court grants the
motion by the Bureau of Prisons.
This would seem to render your case moot: you have been
released from prison into supervised release, thereby obtaining
the relief you desired when filing your collateral attack. But you
appeal the finding of mootness, arguing that a determination of
whether you were held in prison too long could persuade the
original sentencing court5 3 that your period of supervised release
should be shortened. This potential for relief, you argue, keeps
this controversy "live" for purposes of the mootness doctrine.
Alternatively, you argue in your initial collateral attack both
that you have been in prison too long and that that extra time
should be credited to your period of supervised release. In the
interim, you are released from prison, and the Bureau of Prisons
files a petition to render the post-conviction proceeding moot,
which is granted by the court. You appeal this decision, arguing
that the potential to shorten your period of supervised release
keeps the controversy "live."
These are not hypothetical scenarios. They have occurred in
nearly every circuit of the federal courts, with vastly different
results. This section begins by examining relevant Supreme
Court precedent, and then goes on to explore the different
approaches taken by (and at times within) the circuits on the
question of whether or not scenarios like those described above
are moot.
53 Note that under 18 USC § 3583, it is the sentencing court that has the ability to
modify an offender's term of supervised release.
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A. The Supreme Court, the Mootness Doctrine, and Supervised
Release
The Supreme Court has addressed the applicability of the
mootness doctrine toward supervised release in a number of
cases. These cases have developed contradictory lines of reason-
ing regarding whether a case becomes moot when the petitioner
is released from prison into a term of supervised release while
his motion for collateral review is pending.
1. Lane v Williams.54
In 1975, Lawrence Williams pleaded guilty to burglary in
Illinois state court pursuant to a plea bargain, a charge which at
the time carried an indefinite term of imprisonment and a man-
datory three-year period of parole. 55 No one informed him of the
mandatory period of parole that came with his plea.56 In May
1976, Williams was released on bail, and in March 1977, he was
arrested on other charges and returned to prison as a parole
violator.5 7 While in custody for his parole violation, Williams col-
laterally attacked his sentence, alleging that he was not in-
formed of the mandatory term of parole until two months prior to
his initial release and was therefore denied his right to due pro-
cess. 58 While the case was still pending, 59 Williams was released
on a special six-month "supervisory release term," which he
served in full and was then released from the custody of the
Illinois Department of Corrections.60 Another Illinois man expe-
rienced a similar chain of events, and their appeals were joined.61
The Court of Appeals concluded that the cases were
not moot. While Williams's term of parole had expired, the
court concluded that the controversy was still "live" because
"there remain[ed] collateral consequences which might have
lingering effects"-the parole violation would remain on
54 455 US 624 (1982).
55 Id at 625.
56 Id at 626.
51 Id at 626-27.
58 Lane, 455 US at 627.
51 While the case was pending because Williams had not been released, the district
court had ruled in favor of Williams, agreeing that his right to due process had been vio-
lated. He was not immediately released, however, since the district court entered a stay
to give the State an opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration. See id.
60 Id at 627-28.
61 Id at 628.
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Williams's record with "various possible adverse consequences." 62
The State appealed.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the
appellate court and dismissed the case as moot.63 Writing that
"respondents are no longer subject to any direct restraint as a
result of the parole term" and that "[t]heir liberty or freedom of
movement is not in any way curtailed by a parole term that has
expired," the Court held that the controversy was no longer
"live."64 The majority rejected the collateral consequence argu-
ment made by the appellate court, distinguishing prior precedent
that held that the expiration of a criminal sentence did not ren-
der an attack on a criminal conviction moot.65
The dissent, written by Justice Marshall, sharply differed
from the majority over whether or not sufficient "collateral con-
sequences" existed to give the respondents a sufficient personal
stake in the outcome to keep the controversy "live."66 Justice
Marshall characterized the question in the case as "whether col-
lateral consequences attach to parole violations."67 This question,
Marshall stated, had to be determined by state law, and since
collateral consequences did attach to parole violations in Illinois,
the respondents (and the state) retained a significant stake in
the outcome, preventing the case from being moot.68 Both this
strong dissent and Lane's seeming departure from past prece-
dent created uncertainty in an previously clear area of law, lead-
ing to subsequent disagreements in the Supreme Court and
among the federal appellate courts.
62 Lane, 455 US at 629.
63 Id at 634.
64 Id at 631.
65 Id at 632. The cases distinguished by the Court were Carafas, 391 US 234, and
Sibron, 392 US 40. In Carafas, the Court held that the civil penalties the convicted faced
under New York law "were sufficient to ensure that the litigant had 'a substantial stake
in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on
him.'" Lane, 455 US at 632, quoting Carafas, 391 US at 237. In Sibron, the Court held
that "a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collat-
eral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." Lane,
455 US at 632, quoting Sibron, 392 US at 57. In this case, the Court said in Lane, there
might be non-statutory consequences of the parole violation, such as difficulty finding
employment or the sentence imposed in future criminal proceedings, but these "dis-
cretionary decisions ... are not governed by the mere presence or absence of a recorded
violation of parole." Lane, 455 US at 632-33.
66 Lane, 455 US at 634 (Marshall dissenting).
67 Id at 635.
68 Id at 636-41.
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2. Spencer v Kemna.69
In 1998, the Supreme Court decided Spencer v Kemna.70
Randy Spencer was convicted of felony stealing and burglary,
and in 1990 began serving concurrent three-year sentences. 71 In
April 1992 he was granted parole, but in September 1992 his
parole was revoked after the parole board determined that
Spencer violated three of his conditions of parole. 72 In 1993, six
months before his three-year term was set to end, Spencer collat-
erally attacked his sentence under 28 USC § 2254.73 While that
case was pending, however, he was re-released on parole, and in
October of 1993 his term of imprisonment expired, resulting in a
dismissal of the post-conviction proceedings by the district
court.74 The district court dismissed because "the sentences at
issue here have expired, [hence] petitioner is no longer 'in
custody' within the meaning of 28 USC § 2254(a)." 75 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding, following Lane, that the peti-
tioner's claim became moot because he suffered no "collateral
consequences" of the revocation order.76
The Supreme Court affirmed. Citing Sibron v New York, 77
the Court first recognized that it had been willing, in recent dec-
ades, "to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has
continuing collateral consequences." 78 The Court declined to ex-
tend this presumption of collateral consequences to parole
revocation, however. 79 Instead, a party must demonstrate
collateral consequences of parole in order to prevent the case
from being found moot.8 0
69 523 US 1 (1998).
70 Id.
71 Id at 3.
72 Id.
73 Kemna, 523 US at 5.
74 Id at 6.
75 Id.
76 Kemna, 523 US at 6.
77 392 US 40 (1968). See note 51 and accompanying text.
78 Kemna, 523 US at 8.
79 Id at 12.
80 See id at 14. The Court seems to have conflated "mootness" with "standing" in this
case. See, for example, 523 US at 18-19 (Souter concurring) ("One of Spencer's arguments
for finding his present interest adequate to support continuing standing despite his re-
lease from custody."). Justice Stevens dissented, finding that the consequences of the
parole board's finding were sufficiently tangible to defeat a claim of mootness. Id at 25.
He also found that the fact that Spencer was attacking the facts underlying his parole
revocation rather than the revocation itself adequately distinguished Sibron. Id.
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3. United States v Johnson.8'
Ten years later, the Court again addressed the question of
whether being released from prison into a term of supervised
release renders a motion for post-conviction proceedings moot.
Roy Lee Johnson was convicted in 1990 to a sentence of 171
months imprisonment, consisting of three concurrent fifty-one-
month terms to be followed by two consecutive sixty-month
terms, to be followed by a mandatory three-year term of super-
vised release.8 2 The Court of Appeals concluded that the district
court had erred during sentencing and remanded the case to the
district court, at which time the district court modified Johnson's
sentence to 111 months.8 3 After a Supreme Court decision affect-
ing one of his convictions, Johnson filed a collateral attack on his
sentence under 28 USC § 2255, seeking to vacate the conviction.
Since the Government did not oppose, the District Court granted
the motion and modified Johnson's sentence to fifty-one
months.8 4 Johnson had already served more than fifty-one
months, so he was released from prison, at which time his term
of supervised release went into effect.8 5 Johnson then filed a
motion seeking to reduce his period of supervised release by two-
and-a-half years, the amount of extra time he had served in pris-
on.86 The district court denied relief and a divided court of ap-
peals reversed, arguing that awarding "credit for the time
served" "would provide meaningful relief because supervised re-
lease, while serving rehabilitative purposes, is also 'punitive in
nature.'"8 7
The Supreme Court reversed. Relying on a textual reading of
18 USC § 3624(e), which deals with supervised release,88 the
Court held that a period of supervised release is imposed dis-
tinctly from a period of imprisonment, and that "supervised re-
lease has no statutory function until confinement ends."8 9
While holding that the text dictated the outcome, the Court
also noted that its conclusion "accords with the statute's purpose
81 529 US 53 (2000).
82 Id at 55.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Johnson, 529 US at 55.
86 Id.
87 Id at 55-56.
88 See 18 USC § 3624(e). See also notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
89 See Johnson, 528 US at 56-59.
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and design."90 The Court stated that incarceration and super-
vised release serve different ends-that while imprisonment is
supposed to be punitive, supervised release was designed to ful-
fill "rehabilitative ends," helping the released prisoner to tran-
sition to life outside of prison.91 To shorten an offender's period of
supervised release with a "credit" from extra time served would
undermine those goals. 92
While holding the statute, "by its own necessary operation,"
could not reduce the length of supervised release, the Supreme
Court noted that Johnson could file for modification of his
sentence of supervised release under 18 USC § 3583(e).93
Furthermore, the Court stated that "[t]here can be no doubt that
equitable considerations of great weight exist when an individual
is incarcerated beyond the proper expiration of his prison
term."94
These dueling impulses within Johnson-that a textual
interpretation mandates that supervised release be thought of as
conceptually and temporally distinct from incarceration, and that
equitable considerations of great weight exist when a prisoner is
incarcerated for longer than is proper-along with the "collateral
consequence" line of analysis in earlier cases, have caused much
of the resulting disagreement amongst and within the circuits as
to whether post-conviction proceedings become moot when the
prisoner is released, or whether the possibility that a "credit" can
be applied to shorten the prisoner's term of supervised relief is
sufficient to keep the controversy "live" for purposes of the moot-
ness doctrine. Currently, the Third and Eighth Circuits hold that
a post-conviction proceeding is moot if the prisoner is released;
the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
hold that the possibility that a released inmate's term of super-
vised relief could be shortened keeps the post-conviction proceed-
ing "live" for purposes of the mootness doctrine; and the Sixth
and Tenth Circuits are internally split on the question. Each of
the circuits' positions is examined below.
9o Id at 59.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Johnson, 529 US at 60. See also notes 5-19 and accompanying text. Note, however,
that Johnson would have to serve at least a year of supervised release before being able to
petition for a modification, while he would have only had a six-month term of supervised
release if the extra two-and-a-half years he spent in prison could be applied as a credit to
his period of supervised release.
94 Johnson, 529 US at 60.
[2010:506
4931 A PRUDENTIAL APPROACH TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE 507
B. Release of a Prisoner while Post-Conviction Proceedings Are
Pending Moots the Inquiry, Even if the Offender Is Serving a
Term of Supervised Release
In 1996, John Burkey was serving a sentence for federal con-
trolled substances conviction. 95 He participated in a drug treat-
ment program, and as a result the Bureau of Prisons determined
he was eligible for early release under 18 USC § 3621.96 While
serving his subsequent term of supervised release, Burkey was
arrested for another controlled substance crime and was re-
arrested and sentenced to a fifty-seven-month term of imprison-
ment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. 97
While in prison for the second time, Burkey once again par-
ticipated in the drug treatment program, expecting to again
qualify for early release. 98 However, the Bureau of Prisons de-
termined that he was ineligible for early release because he pre-
viously received early release credit under the statute.99
Burkey collaterally attacked his sentence, challenging the
Bureau of Prison's determination that he was ineligible to for
early release and asking to be released from detention. 100 The
magistrate judge who heard the case found the determination to
be invalid and recommended that Burkey's request for release be
granted.10 1 Nine days before Burkey's statutory release date,
while the post-conviction proceeding was still pending, the
Bureau of Prisons released Burkey and filed a Notice of
Suggestion of Mootness, arguing that the case was moot because
Burkey, by being released, had achieved the end his post-
conviction proceeding sought.10 2 Burkey responded by urging
that his petition was not moot, because "if the District Court
would issue an order approving and adopting the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation, he then would be able to
argue to the sentencing court ... that his supervised release
95 Burkey v Marberry, 556 F3d 142, 144 (3d Cir 2009). For information relating to 18
USC § 3621, see note 23 and accompanying text.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Burkey, 556 F3d at 144-45.
100 Id at 145. Burkey filed his collateral attack under 28 USC § 2241, which is the
method by which prisoners attack their confinement in state prison. Since he was in a
federal prison serving a sentence for federal controlled substances convictions, his collat-
eral attack should have been filed under 28 USC § 2255.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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term should be shortened in light of his having been improperly
denied early release from prison."10 3 The district court dismissed
Burkey's collateral attack as moot, arguing that "to avoid a find-
ing of mootness, Burkey would have to have demonstrated that
the delayed commencement of his supervised release term was
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision."10 4
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 105 The
court started by reasoning that once Burkey was released, a case
or controversy no longer existed for purposes of Article 111.106 The
case or controversy requirement of Article III, the court wrote,
"continues through all stages" of the litigation, and "requires
that parties have a personal stake in the outcome."' 07 This per-
sonal stake requirement, the court elaborated, "means that,
throughout the litigation, the plaintiff, 'must have suffered, or be
threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'" l08
After stating the requirements of Article III, the court went
on to discuss a lack of presumption of injury once a person has
been released from imprisonment and is serving his term of
supervised release, and the requirement that a person prove
some continuing injury, or "collateral consequence" for the action
to continue.' 0 9 These collateral consequences, the Third Circuit
noted, have been addressed by the Supreme Court "in terms of
the 'likelihood' that a favorable decision would address the injury
or wrong."110 The "likely" outcome, the Court explained, was that
the sentencing court would not modify Burkey's term of super-
vised release,"' and Burkey's case was therefore dismissed as
moot.
103 Burkey, 556 F3d at 145.
104 Id at 146. In doing so, the district court cited to Kemna, 523 US at 7. See id.
According to the district court, the Third Circuit relates, "it was pure speculation that a
favorable decision from this court would 'likely' result in Burkey's sentencing court reduc-
ing or terminating his supervised release term." Id. The district court also cited to
Johnson, 529 US at 57-58, noting that supervised release and incarceration are designed
to serve different functions and should therefore not be considered interchangeable. This,
the district court reasoned, would further diminish the likelihood that the sentencing
court would modify the term of supervised release. See Burkey, 556 F3d at 146.
105 Id at 151.
106 Id at 147.
107 Id.
108 Burkey, 556 F3d at 147, quoting Kemna, 523 US at 7.
109 Id.
110 Id at 148.
III Id at 149 ("From a practical and legal standpoint, we too doubt whether a sentenc-
ing judge, having imposed a specific form of imprisonment and supervised release, would
alter his view of the propriety of that sentence because the BOP [Bureau of Prisons]
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The Eighth Circuit has adopted the Johnson approach that
holds that the term of imprisonment is distinct from the term of
supervised release.11 2
C. The Possibility That the Term of Supervised Release Could
Be Shortened Keeps the Case "Live" for Purposes of the
Mootness Doctrine
The approach taken by the Third Circuit in Burkey sharply
contrasts with the approach taken by the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits when addressing
similar cases.
In Gunderson v Hood,11 3 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
possibility that Gunderson could receive relief in the form of a
reduced or modified term of supervised release was enough to
prevent the case from being moot.114 Gunderson was admitted to
a drug treatment program while serving his period of incarcera-
tion, but was not eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 USC
§ 3621 because of the nature of his conviction. 115 He filed a col-
lateral attack challenging his ineligibility for early release.1 16
While noting that it was not possible for the court to provide
Gunderson with the relief he sought-early release-because he
was not scheduled to complete the program until his scheduled
release date, the court stated that its inability to grant
Gunderson's requested relief in the form of early release from
incarceration did not render his entire case moot because of its
decision's possible effect on the length of Gunderson's term of
supervised release. 117
The looser requirement that relief only be "possible," not
"likely," is also evident in Mujahid v Daniels.118 The Ninth
Circuit explained that "the burden of demonstrating mootness is
a heavy one," and that an appeal is only moot "when, by virtue of
required him to serve it."). For criticism of this position, see Part III.B.
112 See, for example, James v Outlaw, 142 Fed Appx 274 (8th Cir 2005) ("Having care-
fuHlly reviewed the record, we conclude the case is moot: James was released from prison
while the appeal was pending, return of the good-time credits at issue would have no
effect on his current term of supervised release, and at this time we see no collateral
consequences from the challenged disciplinary action.").
113 268 F3d 1149 (9th Cir 2001).
114 Id at 1153.
15 Id. See note 23 and accompanying text for more information on the contours of 18
USC § 3621.
116 Gunderson, 268 F3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir 2001).
117 Id.
18 413 F3d 991 (9th Cir 2005).
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an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any
effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant." 119
The Second Circuit expressly adopted Mujahid in Levine v
Apkar,120 holding that "the fact that the district court might, be-
cause of our ruling, modify the length of Levine's supervised re-
lease would constitute 'effectual relief.' A case or controversy
thus exists."121 This approach to the "personal stake" aspect of
the mootness doctrine, as well as the position that only a "possi-
bility" of success must exist in order for the controversy to re-
main "live" has also been adopted in the First Circuit,122 the
Fourth Circuit, 123 the Fifth Circuit, 24 and the Seventh Circuit.125
D. Intra-Circuit Conflicts
Two circuits have issued inconsistent opinions when dealing
with these questions. While the Sixth Circuit has stated that
such claims are not moot in unpublished opinions, 26 in Demis v
119 Id at 994, quoting Calderon v Moore, 518 US 149 (1996) (emphasis added).
120 455 F3d 71 (2d Cir 2006).
121 Id at 77.
122 See, for example, US v Molak, 276 F3d 45, 48 (1st Cir 2002) ("Just as a parolee
would have a continuing stake in the outcome of a challenge to the underlying conviction
and sentence because the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole, so too a convict-
ed defendant who is under an ongoing sentence of supervised release has a continuing
stake.") (internal citations omitted); US v Cruzado-Laureano, 527 F3d 231, 234 n 1 (1st
Cir 2008) ("If Cruzado were to succeed with a claim that his sentence was improperly
calculated, his three year period of supervised release could be reduced on demand."),
citing US v Verdin, 243 F3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir 2001).
123 See, for example, Townes v Jarvis, 577 F3d 543, 547-48 (4th Cir 2009) (noting that
for a claim of mootness to prevail, the claim must lack one of the prongs of standing, and
that there must be "no realistic possibility" that a plaintiff could obtain the requested
relief in order to fail the redressability requirement, and that in this case Townes is "able
and ready" to obtain the a shorter period of parole, the ultimate relief sought).
124 See, for example, Johnson v Pettiford, 442 F3d 917, 918 (5th Cir 2006) ("In this
case, the possibility that the district court may alter Johnson's period of supervised re-
lease pursuant to 18 USC § 3583(e)(2), if it determines that he has served excess prison
time, prevents Johnson's petition from being moot.").
125 See, for example, US v Trotter, 270 F3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir 2001) ("Unless we are
confident that Trotter cannot benefit from success on appeal, the case is not moot.); US v
Larson, 417 F3d 741, 747 (7th Cir 2005) ("Though his imprisonment is over, Larson re-
mains on supervised release, which is a form of custody. Larson correctly points out that
the case is not moot if the judge on remand would have discretion to shorten his super-
vised release.") (internal citations omitted).
126 See, for example, US v Wilson, 87 Fed Appx 553, 555-56 (6th Cir 2004) ("[Blecause
Wilson remains on supervised release, only Wilson's appeal of the expired custodial sen-
tence appears moot as having already been served.... The remaining, unexpired term [ I
of appellant's supervised release may be reviewed."); US v Lewis, 166 Fed Appx 193, 195
(6th Cir 2006) ("Challenges, however, to Lewis's unexpired term of supervised release are
not moot.").
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Sniezek127 the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the Mujahid and
Levine line of cases, instead finding that "[blecause Demis was
already transferred to a CCC [Community Correctional Center]
and now has been released from custody, no actual injury re-
mains that the Court could redress with a favorable decision in
this appeal."128
The Tenth Circuit's opinions on the subject are even more
contradictory. In Crawford v Booker,1 29 the Tenth Circuit
followed Johnson, holding that "based on Johnson, even if Mr.
Crawford's legal argument was successful, this court could not
shorten the length of his supervised release term."130 In 2003,
however, the Tenth Circuit decided United States v Santiago
Castro-Rocha,131 which expressly joined the First, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits in holding "that a defendant's unexpired term
of supervised release, which could be reduced by a favorable ap-
pellate decision, is sufficient to defeat a claim of mootness. " 132
While in 2007 the Tenth Circuit followed this precedent in
Peterson v Lappin,1 33 in 2008 a district court returned to the ap-
proach taken in Crawford, holding in Fields v Wiley1 34 that "[iun
light of Crawford, even if the Applicant were to prevail in this
case, Applicant's good conduct time cannot be applied to his
period of supervised release, and does not provide a basis for a
collateral consequence."135
E. Summary
In sum, there are currently two main lines of analysis used
to evaluate the question of mootness for these types of cases in
the federal courts. One approach, used most often to find cases
moot, requires that it be "likely," rather than merely "possible,"
that the sentencing court will reduce the term of supervised
release originally imposed, and more strictly separates the term
of imprisonment from the term of supervised release, relying
heavily on Johnson.
127 558 F3d 508 (6th Cir 2009).
128 Id at 513.
129 2000 WL 1179782 (10th Cir).
130 Id at *2.
131 323 F3d 846 (10th Cir 2003).
132 Id at 847.
133 2007 WL 2332083, *1 (10th Cir).
134 2008 WL 1840725 (D Colo).
135 Id at *3.
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The other approach, most often used to hold that these types
of challenges are not moot simply because a person's term of im-
prisonment has ended and a term of supervised release has be-
gun, only requires that there be some "possibility," rather
than "likelihood," that the petitioner will obtain the relief sought
before the sentencing court. Holding that mootness is a heavy
burden to prove, this is a more flexible approach to the
mootness doctrine.
III. REASSESSING THE MooTNESS DOCTRINE
This Part seeks to reconcile the circuit split discussed in the
previous Part, arguing that the Third, Eighth, and (at times) the
Sixth and Tenth Circuits' approach to the question of whether
post-conviction proceedings become moot after the petitioner is
released into supervised release is incorrect.
These circuits have misapplied the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence on the mootness doctrine. The Supreme Court has been
willing to take a flexible approach to the "collateral consequenc-
es" exception to the mootness doctrine in criminal cases. More
importantly, the mootness doctrine, according to the Supreme
Court, does not require that the outcome on remand be certain to
prevent a case from being moot. Instead, it is enough that a fa-
vorable court decision could possibly grant the plaintiff his re-
quested relief.
Additionally, the judiciary's current approach to the moot-
ness doctrine needs to be reformulated. The doctrine as currently
articulated has a number of problems, including that the stand-
ing and mootness doctrines are convoluted and frequently con-
fused. While the Supreme Court has noted that the mootness
doctrine should not merely be considered "standing set in a time
frame,"136 it has not articulated clear guidance as to which fac-
tors are to be considered or how mootness should be distin-
guished from standing.
Finally, this Part argues that the mootness doctrine should
be understood as a flexible doctrine rooted in notions of judicial
economy and prudential considerations, rather than as mandat-
ed by the Article III "cases and controversies" clause. This un-
derstanding better comports with the purposes of the justiciabil-
ity doctrines. To illustrate this point, this Part examines what
factors should be considered when a petitioner enters supervised
136 See notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
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release while his post-conviction proceeding is pending, with an
emphasis on how the recession has affected that analysis.
A. The Supreme Court's Precedents Are Being Misapplied
Mere release of the prisoner does not mechanically fore-
close consideration of the merits by the Court. 137
One of the long-recognized exceptions to the mootness doc-
trine has been the "collateral consequences" exception, which
permits adjudication where "under either state or federal law
further penalties can be imposed as a result of the judgment."1 38
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that there are
collateral consequences of being convicted of a crime. 139 These
consequences are now presumed to exist. 140 While some Supreme
Court precedent has indicated that supervised release should be
thought of as a category separate from incarceration, 141 there is
no doubt that legal consequences attach to supervised release.' 42
Even though many of the requirements imposed on persons in
supervised release are non-legal in subject matter (requirements
to obtain and maintain employment, live in certain areas, and so
forth), the consequence of failing to comply with those condi-
tions143-namely, a return to prison-is legal in nature. Hence,
collateral consequences in cases where a prisoner is serving a
term of supervised release ought to be presumed, preventing
these cases from being moot. 144
While the presence of collateral consequences should be pre-
sumed in all these cases, preventing them from being moot, a
further and more serious misapplication of Supreme Court juris-
137 Sibron, 392 US at 51.
138 See Sibron, 392 US at 53-54, quoting St. Pierre v US, 319 US 41 at 43 (1943).
139 See, for example, North Carolina v Rice, 404 US 244, 247 (1971) ("A number of
disabilities may attach to a convicted defendant even after he has left prison.").
140 See, for example, Spencer, 523 US at 8 ("In recent decades, we have been willing to
presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences (or
what is effectively the same, to count collateral consequences that are remote and unlike-
ly to occur).").
141 See notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
142 See notes 7-18 and accompanying text. Compare also US v Trotter, 270 F3d 1150,
1152 (7th Cir 2001) (-Trotter's imprisonment is over, but he remains on supervised re-
lease, a form of custody.") with Johnson, 529 US at 59-60 (arguing that supervised custo-
dy served rehabilitative ends rather than punitive ones, though not disputing that super-
vised release is a form of custody).
143 Sometimes through no fault of their own. See note 178 and accompanying text.
144 See also Sibron, 392 US at 57 ("[A] criminal case is moot only if it is shown that
there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis
of the challenged conviction.").
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prudence is present in the reasoning of the Third, Eighth, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the
mootness doctrine does not require that it be certain, or even
likely, that a favorable decision by a court redress the petition-
er's claim.145 Instead, the Supreme Court has held that a case
should be found moot only if the claimant no longer has a "per-
sonal stake" in the outcome-in other words, if the decision of the
court can no longer have an effect on the individual. 146
The Third, Eighth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, by basing
their decisions that a case is moot on their guess about the likeli-
hood that the petitioner's claim would be successful on re-
mand, 147 do not properly analyze whether the petitioner retains a
"personal stake" in the outcome. In fact, in evaluating the claim's
likelihood of success on remand, these circuits implicitly
acknowledge that the claimants do have a personal stake in the
litigation: they recognize that the "unlikely" conclusion would
have the effect the petitioner desires, that of reducing his term of
supervised release.
Appellate courts often remand cases when they are un-
certain of the outcome. The role of these courts is to clarify the
law and ensure consistency within their circuits. The role of
these courts is not to engage in speculation about outcomes. By
failing to acknowledge that the petitioners have retained a
"personal stake" in the outcome, these circuits have misapplied
the mootness doctrine as currently formulated by the Supreme
Court.
B. The Mootness Doctrine Reformulated
This section argues that the mootness doctrine should be re-
formulated. The doctrine as currently formulated is not only un-
clear, but creates unnecessary confusion by conflating standing
145 This incorrect approach can be traced to the now-discredited idea that mootness be
thought of as "standing set in a time frame," which has led some circuits-mistakenly, in
my view-to adopt the same three-part test for standing (which does require that redress-
ibilty be likely, rather than merely speculative) to evaluate mootness claims. For further
discussion of this confusion of standing and mootness, see notes 165-70 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of standing, see notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
146 See, for example, Geraghty, 445 US at 397 ("The 'personal stake' aspect of moot-
ness doctrine also serves primarily the purpose of assuring that federal courts are pre-
sented with disputes they are capable of resolving."). See also note 50 and accompanying
text, as well as Part III.B.
147 See, for example, Burkey, 556 F3d at 148 ("The likely' outcome here is not that the
District Court's order will not cause the sentencing court in Ohio to reduce Burkey's term
of supervised release.").
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with mootness. 148 Instead of being understood as a constitution-
ally mandated doctrine, the mootness doctrine should be under-
stood as a flexible, prudential doctrine, which would allow it to
better serve its purpose of ensuring that courts only hear con-
crete disputes that are capable of judicial resolution.
1. Theoretical background.
The justiciability doctrines outlined in section I.D. were de-
veloped to deal with a number of concerns about the role of the
judiciary in America. The judiciary and many scholars root the
justiciability doctrines in Article III, which limits the courts to
deciding "cases or controversies."1 49 This is not a necessary read-
ing, however.150 Justifications for the justiciability doctrines are
generally centered on the maintenance of the separation of pow-
ers in our tripartite system of government. 51 The mootness doc-
trine in particular is based on the idea that courts should not
issue advisory opinions or decide abstract or hypothetical ques-
tions.1 52 The doctrine is also based in part on concerns about
judicial economy (that a court should not waste its resources on
disputes where there is "nothing" at stake). 153
The justiciability doctrines have been extensively criti-
cized. 154 Their critics charge that the justiciability doctrines are
unprincipled 155 and are nothing more than concealed decisions on
the merits 156 that represent judicial preferences rather than legal
148 In addition to the discussion in this section, see the text accompanying notes 166-
71 for an example of the problems that have arisen as a result of this confusion.
149 See Article III, § 2. See also Jonathan R Siegal, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 Tex L
Rev 73, 76 (2008) ("Although the Constitution does not define the terms 'cases' and 'con-
troversies,' the courts have understood these words to impose a constellation of con-
straints known collectively as doctrines of justiciability."); Rice, 404 US at 246.
150 For further discussion, see notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
151 See Lujan, 504 US at 559-60.
152 See Rice, 404 US at 246 ("Early in its history this court held that it had no power
to issue advisory opinions and it has frequently repeated that federal courts are without
power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before
them.").
153 See Monaghan, 82 Yale L J at 1383 (cited in note 46).
154 For a small slice of the literature criticizing the justiciability doctrines, see gener-
ally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 NC L Rev 1741 (1999); Erwin
Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 Const L Rev 677 (1989); Seigel, 86
Tex L Rev 75 (cited in note 149); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for
Abandonment, 62 Cornell L Rev 664 (1977); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72
Cal L Rev 69 (1984); Corey C. Watson, Comment: Mootness and the Constitution, 86 Nw U
L Rev 143 (1991).
155 Watson, 86 Nw U L Rev at 145 (cited in note 154).
156 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage between Justiciability and Remedies-and
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principles. 157 The characterization of the mootness doctrine as
unprincipled and inconsistent has not been helped by the Court,
which has said that its cases "demonstrate the flexible character
of the Art. III mootness doctrine," and that "[t]he justiciability
doctrine is one of uncertain and shifting contours."158
Part of the criticism of the mootness doctrine comes from the
lack of clarity as to whether the doctrine is a constitutional
imperative or based on prudential considerations. 159 It was not
until 1964 that the Supreme Court expressly stated that the
mootness doctrine was rooted in Article III, and even then it was
done "remarkably casual[ly]."160 The numerous exceptions to the
mootness doctrine have caused some to argue that the doctrine
cannot be rooted in the Constitution for these exceptions to re-
main coherent. Perhaps the most interesting advocate of this
position was Chief Justice Rehnquist. In Honig v Doe, Chief
Justice Rehnquist argued that a "reconsideration of our mootness
jurisprudence may be in order."'' He argued that the mootness
doctrine must be understood as prudential, because if the doc-
trine is constitutionally based, then the exceptions 6 2 to the
mootness doctrine make the doctrine "incomprehensible." 16 3 He
also argued that the mootness doctrine should be relaxed from
the perspective of preserving judicial economy, because it makes
little sense to spend resources briefing, arguing, and thinking
about a case only to find it moot. 64
Their Connection to Substantive Rights, 92 Va L Rev 633, 634-35 (2006).
157 See Pierce, 77 NC L Rev at 1742-43 (cited in note 154).
158 See Geraghty, 445 US at 400-01.
159 This distinction matters because if it a prudential doctrine, Congress and the
courts are able to define its contours in a way they cannot do if the doctrine is con-
stitutionally based. See Honig v Doe, 484 US 305, 330 (1988) (Rehnquist concurring).
160 See Lee, 105 Harv L Rev at 611 (cited in note 38). The case was Liner v Jafco, Inc.,
373 US 301 (1964).
161 Honig, 484 US at 329 (Rehnquist concurring).
162 See notes 50-52 and accompanying text. In addition to the collateral consequences
exception to the mootness doctrine, there is an exception for instances that are "capable of
repetition yet evading review" and for voluntary cessation, where a defendant voluntarily
ceases the offensive behavior but is capable of resuming it at any time. Challenges to
election laws are often allowed under the "capable of repetition yet evading review" ex-
ception even though the election has taken place because the challenged activity is con-
sidered likely to occur in a future election and the length of time required for litigation
will prevent a full adjudication. See, for example, Moore v Ogilvie, 394 US 814, 816
(1969). Laidlaw, 528 US at 189, is an example of the voluntary cessation exception. There
Justice Ginsburg explained that voluntary cessation would only moot a case if the moving
party can meet the "'heavy burden of persuading' the court that the challenged conduct
cannot reasonably be expected to start up again."
163 Honig, 484 US at 329-32.
164 Id at 332.
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2. The conflation of standing and mootness.
The Supreme Court's current articulation of the mootness
doctrine is unclear, leading to confusion and inconsistency in the
lower courts.
The Court's formulation of mootness as merely "standing set
in a time frame" 165 led the courts to examine mootness with the
same three-part test used to evaluate standing. 166 While the
Supreme Court has deemed this characterization of standing
'not comprehensive," 167 a more complete characterization or
understanding has not yet been developed by the Court.
It is understandable that lower courts are attracted to this
conception of mootness. The Supreme Court has articulated a
clear three-part test for what is required for standing-much
more clarity than the other justiciability doctrines have been
given. The test gives lower courts clear guidance, always attrac-
tive for lower-court judges averse to reversal. Additionally, while
the Court has backed away from the formulation of mootness as
"standing set in a time frame,"1 68 it has neither expressly
repudiated that sentiment nor has it more clearly formulated the
mootness doctrine.
The problem with the formulation of mootness as "standing
set in a time frame," however, is that it fails to recognize the
different goals of standing and mootness. 69 While standing is
meant to ensure that the proper parties are before the court,
mootness ensures that the court can actually do something about
the dispute. The focus, then, should be on the capacity of the
court to provide some meaningful relief to the parties, 170 not on
whether the proper person is before the court. A prudential
approach would better serve the primary goal of the mootness
doctrine, which is to ensure the court does not waste its
resources by guaranteeing that it can provide some meaningful
relief to the petitioner.
165 See note 46 and accompanying text.
166 See note 41 and accompanying text. This approach to the mootness doctrine is
evident in courts on both sides of the circuit split discussed in Part III. See Burkey, 556
F3d at 147; Townes, 577 F3d at 546-47, citing Lujan, 504 US at 560-61.
167 See notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
168 Id.
169 See notes 40-49 and accompanying text. While these two doctrines are rooted in
many of the same concerns, they do target slightly different problems and should be
understood as such.
170 For an argument that the courts are already primarily concerned with remedies,
and that this can explain outcomes, see Fallon, 92 Va L Rev 633 (cited in note 156).
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3. A prudential approach to the mootness doctrine.
This section argues that a prudential approach to the moot-
ness doctrine better fulfills the ends of the justiciability doctrines
and, if properly guided by the Supreme Court, will lead to more
consistent results in the courts. This section first examines the
arguments in favor of this approach and then examines the
factors that should be considered in cases like those outlined in
Part II.
a) Arguments in favor of a prudential approach. Ac-
cepting that the justiciability doctrines serve valuable ends, in-
cluding preserving judicial economy and, most importantly,
creating and maintaining institutional legitimacy, there are
many benefits to adopting a prudential approach to the mootness
doctrine.
First, this approach would allow the courts to do openly
what they already do in practice without stretching the mootness
doctrine to the level of incoherence. 171 Richard Fallon has argued
that
[W]hen the Supreme Court feels apprehensions about the
availability or non-availability of remedies, it sometimes
responds by adjusting applicable justiciability rules, ei-
ther to dismiss the claims of parties who seek un-
acceptable remedies or to license suits by parties seeking
relief that the Court thinks it is important to award. 172
If the justiciability doctrines were grounded in Article III,
these sorts of machinations by the Court would render the
justiciability doctrines meaningless and would undermine the
legitimacy of the judiciary as a whole. Transferring to a pruden-
tial approach would more accurately reflect judicial practice and
would better maintain the judiciary's legitimacy.
Second, a prudential approach allows Congress to exercise
more oversight and control over the jurisdiction of the courts,
preserving traditional understandings about the relationship
between the legislature and the judiciary.173 Furthermore, a pru-
171 See id; Pierce, 77 NC L Rev 1741 (cited in note 154); Lee, 105 Harv L Rev 603
(cited in note 38); Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GW
L Rev 562 (2009); Don B. Kates, Jr., and William T. Barker, Mootness in Judicial Pro-
ceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory, 62 Cal L Rev 1385 (1974).
172 Fallon, 92 Va L Rev at 636 (cited in note 156).
173 See Lee, 105 Harv L Rev at 608; 612-15 (cited in note 38).
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dential approach is better able to guard against waste of judicial
resources by allowing notions of institutional competence to be
considered. 174
A flexible approach to the mootness doctrine, albeit one
guided by certain considerations, would allow for case-by-case
balancing, hopefully resulting in more nuanced decisions. A
prudentially based approach would also prevent courts from
hiding behind the justiciability doctrines and force them to re-
solve cases that they have the ability to effectively adjudicate.
This, in turn, would enhance the legitimacy of the court in the
eyes of the public.
b) Factors to be considered. The first and most im-
portant factor to be considered is whether the court is able to
provide meaningful relief. By keeping these petitioner's cases
"live," the courts in these cases keep open the possibility that the
sentencing court could reduce the petitioner's term of supervised
release. This has both meaningful legal and practical con-
sequences, especially in the current economic recession.
The legal effect is apparent: a favorable decision would
shorten the petitioner's time in custody (including his term of
supervised release). The Court, however, should also
acknowledge the practical, real-life difficulties faced by people
serving a term of supervised release when examining whether a
favorable decision would provide meaningful relief.
Currently, the collateral consequences analysis is restricted
to legal consequences and civil penalties. 175 In addition to focus-
ing on these injuries, the prudential approach should examine
the practical difficulties suffered by people serving a term of su-
pervised release. People serving a term of supervised release can
be subject to, for example, restrictions on their mobility,
requirements for obtaining and keeping employment, and re-
quirements to support themselves and others. 176 Additionally,
they must also find a place to live and try to rebuild their lives.
All the while, the possibility of revocation of supervised release
and a return to prison is a background threat. 177
174 See Watson, 86 Nw U L Rev at 152-53 (cited in note 154).
175 See note 65 and accompanying text.
176 See notes 7-18 and accompanying text.
177 For descriptions and data of the difficulties that ex-offenders face as they try to
reenter society, see generally Jeremy Travis, Amy L. Sullivan, and Michelle Waul, From
Prison to Home: The Dimensions and Consequences of Prisoner Reentry (The Urban Insti-
tute 2001), online at http;/www.urban.org/pdfs/fromprison to-home.pdf (visited Sept 14,
2010); Marlaina Freisthler and Mark A Godsey, Going Home to Stay: A Review of
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While offenders often face circumstances that should be con-
sidered collateral consequences of supervised release for pur-
poses of determining whether the court could provide meaningful
relief, the recession has exacerbated the challenges and collateral
consequences of supervised release. Always last in line for jobs,
offenders may find it nearly impossible to secure gainful em-
ployment during a recession, but such employment is often a re-
quirement of their conditional release. 178 An offender's inability
to move freely also affects him disproportionally during a
recession, since he cannot move easily to find available jobs.
Another consideration that should be at the forefront of a
court's mind when adjudicating these cases is whether the
Bureau of Prisons will be able to insulate its policies from review
if these cases are not reviewed and resolved because they are
declared moot. The cases that make up the circuit split outlined
in Part II follow a similar pattern: a prisoner challenges some
administrative action of the Bureau of Prisons, alleging that it
have made some sort of mistake or its policies violate the law.179
In many of these cases, either a magistrate judge has issued an
advisory opinion agreeing with the position of the prisoner, or
the Board of Prisons suspects that it will lose the challenge.'80 In
either case, while the petition is pending the Board of Prisons
releases the petitioner and files a petition to declare the original
action moot. This course of action both insulates actions of the
Bureau of Prisons and causes situations where other prisoners
can be harmed by the Bureau's mistakes or bad policies. By
declaring that the petition is moot as soon as the prisoner is re-
leased from prison, the approach of the Third, Eighth, and (at
times) Sixth and Tenth Circuits insulates the Board's mistakes
and bad policies from judicial review. 8 1 Such a system should
Collateral Consequences of Conviction, Post-Incarceration Employment, and Recidivism in
Ohio, 36 U Toledo L Rev 525 (2004-2005); Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home:
Parole and Prisoner Reentry (Oxford 2003); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and
Parole in the United States, 2008 (cited in note 1).
178 See, for example, Associated Press, Ex-Cons Face Tough Path Back into Work
Force, MSNBC (July 13, 2009), online at httpV/www.msnbc.msn.conmid/32208419/ns/
business-careers/ (visited Sept 14, 2010) ("It's difficult for ex-felons to find steady jobs
even in good economic times, with unemployment rates sometimes as high as 75 percent
for those one year out of prison. During the worst recession in a quarter century, it can be
almost impossible.").
179 See, for example, Burkey, 556 F3d at 145. Burkey challenged the determination of
the Bureau of Prisons that a prisoner could only gain credits toward early release the
first time he completed a drug treatment program, alleging that the procedure used vio-
lated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
180 See, for example, Burkey, 556 F3d at 145.
1 It could also be argued that these cases fall into the "capable of repetition yet evad-
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not be encouraged by the courts, and a prudential understanding
of mootness, which looks to pragmatic factors and can examine
the underlying behavior of the parties, would be much more
effective in combating such gamesmanship than a rigid formula-
tion of "cases and controversies."182
CONCLUSION
This Comment examined the differing approaches taken by
the circuits to the question of whether a prisoner's extra time in
custody should be "credited" toward his period of supervised
release, or whether the prisoner's move from custody to super-
vised release renders his case moot. The circuits that have held
these cases moot have misapplied the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence on the mootness doctrine.
More importantly, however, examination of this circuit split
illustrates that the Supreme Court's current formulation of the
mootness doctrine is largely unworkable and needs to be
reformulated. By conflating standing and mootness, the Court
has undermined the different purposes that each justiciability
doctrine is meant to serve, and has led to confusion and incon-
sistency in the application of the mootness doctrine.
The mootness doctrine should be decoupled from the "cases
and controversies" requirement of Article III. The mootness doc-
trine, like all the justiciability doctrines, is judicially created and
not strictly mandated by the Constitution. A prudential under-
standing of the mootness doctrine better serves the goals of the
justiciability doctrines, better comports with how courts are
actually evaluating these claims, and allows the courts to fulfill
their role in our system of government by adjudicating claims
worthy of resolution.
ing review" exception to the mootness doctrine. For further discussion, see note 162 and
accompanying text.
182 It should be noted that I am not arguing for a fundamental change in the
procedures imposed by 28 USC § 2255, nor am I denying that post-conviction proceedings
take up a huge amount of judicial resources. Casting the mootness doctrine as prudential
rather than constitutionally mandated, however, would not "open the floodgates" of
collateral attacks by prisoners. Prisoners hoping to collaterally attack their convictions
will still be required to clear the high hurdles imposed by Congress. A prudential
approach to the mootness doctrine would simply allow those prisoners who are able to
clear those procedural hurdles to have their claims heard if the court is able to provide
effectual relief.

